Radiation protection: where are we after Fukushima?
This journal has already noted and reported on the fundamental challenges to our system of protection arising from the Fukushima event. The principal issues identified through an International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Task Group have been reported (Gonzalez et al 2013) , and in an Invited Editorial the ICRP Scientific Secretary noted the importance of examining each of the issues and recommendations to assess whether the primary difficulties lie in communication and understanding of the system, or in the system itself (Clement 2013) . It is therefore important that these issues are fully debated by the radiation protection community as we seek to identify how best to proceed.
From a personal perspective it seems clear that the System of Radiation Protection has grown and become more complex over time as it has broadened from its original medical focus into addressing the growth of nuclear power, natural exposure, legacy issues and emergency situations. Whilst it may not be a universally accepted view, it can nonetheless be argued that the system has perhaps become too complex and has become somewhat divorced from elements of common-sense reality.
The experience of Fukushima, and to a large extent also Chernobyl, has shown that at least some aspects of the system need adjustment, in that it has not provided an optimum 'total health' protection for the population-although it has probably performed well in protecting the public and workers from the direct effects of radiation during the Fukushima event.
However, there are other substantive challenges within our system of protection, and particularly in our ability to communicate it to the wider public. Events have also shown that the 'fear of radiation', or more particularly the 'fear of radiation from nuclear facilities', is a significant factor which needs to be taken into consideration as the system of protection is reviewed. However, I would not go so far as to ask, as some commentators have hinted; 'How do we protect people not from radiation but from the effects of radiation protection'. But certainly it can be argued that over-zealous radiation protection is a potential hazard! So a key question is 'how to bring the System of Protection back into better touch with reality?' Three key themes in addressing this challenge are discussed below, together with the identification of some key issues for practitioners.
Review how we present the LNT hypothesis
Much literature on radiation risk states simply that at low doses the risk of death is 5% per Sv. However, the often-forgotten 'small print' in radiation protection philosophy notes that, given uncertainties over the current state of the science (e.g. linear no-threshold (LNT) and thresholds), we prudently assume for the purposes of protection that the detriment (which includes allowances for risks other than death) is as stated above.
A more accurate statement on low dose risk would therefore be to say that 'if there is a risk of death, then it would not be more than X, and could be lower'. This may seem to be a pedantic difference, but it is more honest, and at least keeps reminding us of the important small print that we usually forget.
Note that on this basis, i.e. death rather than detriment, X would be lower than 5% per Sv. It is of course possible to continue to give prime emphasis to the wider concept of detriment, although this is unlikely to be well understood by many parties, and comparison with other risks is more complex.
Provide a relevant and meaningful context for the presentation of radiation risk
In order to provide substance and understanding it would then be important and helpful to situate this potential risk in the context of everyday life within a natural radiation background, where variations in radiation/risk of up to around a few mSv yr −1 are essentially unavoidable, un-noticed and accepted within society (even if somewhat passively). Short-circuiting several steps in the argument, this can lead to a protection philosophy based around a previously promulgated idea of a set of 'bands of acceptability' such as follows:
• Exposures up to a few mSv yr −1 are broadly acceptable (although some minor considerations could apply)
• Exposures up to a few 10 s of mSv yr −1 are likely to be acceptable if there is a balancing benefit for those exposed • Exposures up to a few 100 mSv could be acceptable in rare circumstances such as saving lives or protecting significant societal assets.
This approach is contrasted to the present system where the cautious assumption of the 5% per Sv risk factor, and its rigid and insistent application, leads to a set of dose limits for occupational and public exposure. For public exposure the limit is set at 1 mSv yr −1 , with derivative limits (although called 'constraints') at even lower levels such as 0.3 mSv yr −1 , and clearance and exemption levels (in effect limits applied to such things as recycling metals from decommissioning) of 0.01 mSv yr −1 . These numbers do not align with common-sense experiences of living in a radiation world where normal exposures are at least 2-3 mSv yr −1 , and in many cases significantly higher, and where individual lifestyle decisions such as residency and holiday choice easily result in changed radiation exposure of magnitudes at least similar to those in the preceding paragraph. From a public perspective it seems to imply that risks from the activities being controlled under our system are in fact much more dangerous than they are. And perception issues are clearly not helped when the public are told in an emergency that the 'dose limit' is not actually a limit, and exposures can be allowed to be much higher.
It is therefore argued that, as the system of protection is reviewed and further developed, greater emphasis should be placed on the context of natural background, using the 'banded' approach as above, and that different thinking should be developed around the concept of dose limits.
Of course, in prudently recognising that there is likely to be some risk associated with radiation exposures, the dominant control mechanism should continue to rely on the application of the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle, with an appropriate emphasis on the word reasonable. For exposures within the lower band, this would be expressed through a pragmatic and common-sense approach, but increasing formality and rigour should be applied to higher exposure levels.
Use this broader societal context to enhance public understanding of radiation risk
This is a long term aspiration and a long term programme. We must all do our utmost to engage with the public at all levels in order to inculcate a deeper understanding of radiation issues. This encompasses working with schools, a wide range of citizens groups, and politicians etc. It is best done away from the context of immediate pressures from 'events', and ideally by groups/persons who are clearly not advocating any particular vested interest. Whilst it is important to ensure that written and electronic communications are available at a broad level, it is even more important to engage at a local and personal level with persons/ groups who are interested or potentially impacted by such issues. The International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) and its national Associate Societies are well placed in this regard, although they can only address a small part of the need. This is not seen as the answer to all the challenges, but it would eventually provide a better platform for a more relaxed and thoughtful approach to radiation issues. Also, this is not saying 'tell them the facts and they will love nuclear power', which was perhaps the mantra within the nuclear industry in the 70s, 80s and 90s. But it is a necessary start in order to move forward.
Implications for practitioners
For workplace occupational exposures it is essential to apply an ALARA-based radiation protection culture. All reasonable efforts should be made to keep doses within the 'few mSv yr −1 ' range, with higher exposures (up to a few 10 s mSv yr −1 in the above system, or up to 20 mSv yr −1 in the current ICRP system) only where absolutely necessary after a considered, balanced assessment.
It is not appropriate to advocate the adoption of the threshold approach in place of LNT. This is the wrong argument, and one that cannot be won given the current state of the underpinning science. Issues relating to public acceptance and societal resource allocation, which are often in the minds of those advocating the threshold approach, are better addressed within the framework discussed above.
All parties within the radiation protection community should work out how best to support the long term need to enhance public understanding of radiation issues, whilst noting that some sectors such as the nuclear industry can be seen as potentially conflicted parties in this activity, and hence must tread carefully.
Industry must work with the authorities (government and regulators) to obtain an appropriate basis for emergency planning, taking account of the lessons from Fukushima-including the impact of wider societal and mental health issues.
Finally, obviously, and really without the need to say it, we must all re-double our efforts to avoid the 'big accidents'-both in the nuclear sector and for those using significant radioactive sources.
The way forward
It is important for practitioners to engage actively in the future development of our system of protection. This Invited Editorial is one personal contribution to that debate. As such, it does not represent the views of any particular organization.
As the 'international voice of the radiation protection profession' (Czarwinski 2013) , IRPA and our national and regional Associate Societies are keen to facilitate and encourage this engagement. The ICRP has established a Task Group on the Ethics of Radiological Protection, with the intent of preparing a publication which consolidates the basis of the Recommendations, improves the understanding of the system and provides a basis for communication on radiation risk and its perception. IRPA is assisting in this work by providing platforms for discussion. This mechanism should be used to assess suggestions and contributions to the debate.
